This article explores the extent to which advocacy and attack Party Election Broadcasts (PEBs) affected voters' party preferences during the British general election campaign of 2001. The analysis uses an experimental deslgn that involved conducting "media exposure" tests on a representative sample of Greater London voters (N = 919) during the final weeks of the June 2001 election campaign. Respondents completed a pre-test questionnaire before being exposed to a variety of different media stimuli. Their political attitudes were then measured again in a post-test questionnaire. The empirical findings suggest that, in general, PEBs exerted little direct effect on voters' images of the main political parties in 2001. However, there were a series of "partial" exposure effects confined to particular sub-groups of voters. For example, for non-partisan voters, "attack" advertising appears to have been less effective than "advocacy" advertising. Indeed, in the U.K. in 2001 there were contexts in which negative campaigning was explicitly counter-productive in the sense that it appears to have actively stimulated sympathy for the target of the attack rather than strengthened the relative position of the sponsor. I n recent years scholars and practitioners have turned increasing attention towards understanding the impact of political advertising. One aspect of the debate has revolved around the issue of how far there are significant electoral rewards from either "advocacy" broadcasts, which offer a positive vision of the advertised party, or "attack" broadcasts which concentrate on criticising the opposition.
In this article, we explore the extent to which advocacy and attack Party Election Broadcasts (PEBs) affected voters' party preferences during the British general election campaign of 2001. Our analysis uses an experimental design that involved conducting media exposure tests on a representative sample of Greater London voters (N = 919) during the final weeks of the June 2001 election campaign. Respondents completed a pre-test questionnaire before being exposed to a variety of different media stimuli. Their political attitudes were then measured again in a post-test questionnaire. Our empirical findings suggest that, in general, PEBs exerted little direct effect on voters' images of the main political parties in 2001. However, there were a series of partial exposure effects confined to particular sub-groups of voters. For example, for non-partisan voters, attack advertising appears to have been less effective than advocacy advertising. Indeed, in the U.K. in 2001 there were contexts in which negative campaigning was explicitly counter-productive in the sense that it appears to have actively stimulated sympathy for the target of the attack rather than strengthening the relative position of the sponsor. Part one of this article outlines the theoretical debates and rationales that state the specific hypotheses that we test. Part two describes the NOTE: The authors are lndebted to three of t h~s journalk anonymous ref- experimental design that we used in order to generate the data to test these hypotheses, together with our operational measures. Part three reports our empirical findings.
An extensive literature has sought to assess the effectiveness of television-based campaign advertising in American elections (Pfau and Kinski 1990; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Lau and Sigelman, 2000; b7est 2001; Thurber 2000; Lau and Pomper 2002) . In Britain, many studies have described the evolution and character of campaign communications (see, for example, Scammell 1995; Seymore-Ure 1996; Butler and Kavanagh 2001) and the impact of news media coverage upon electoral behavior (Miller 1991; Norris et al. 1999) . A smaller body of work has focused on trends in the format and contents of party election broadcasts (see Scammell and Semetko 1995; Harrison 2001) . In particular, content analysis by Hodess, Tedesco, and Kaid (2000) noted a tendency towards increased negativity evident in PEB aired during the 1997 campaign, compared with 1992. Similar trends have been documented as continuing in the 2001 election (Pipkin 2001) .
Despite growing interest, there have been few rigorous attempts to evaluate the precise effects of campaign advertising on public opinion in Britain, and the possible impact of any rise in negative messages. Early studies of political advertising, dating from the time that television was first introduced into British campaigns, represent the most important exceptions (Trenaman and McQuail 196 1 ; Blumler and McQuail 1968) . Blumler and McQuail found no influence on voting intention for Conservative and Labour, yet a small but significant increase in Liberal Democrat support from viewers of their broadcasts. They concluded that PEBs were of greater significance for smaller parties, and this corresponds with general research on the effects of political advertising in the US,; the greatest impact being associated with parties or candidates who have relatively low levels of background news media coverage (Kaid and Johnston 2001) . Given the substantial changes in political marketing and professional campaign communications that have occurred over the last thirty years or so, these early British studies are now seriously dated. This in turn suggests the need for a systematic attempt to examine the effects of contemporary PEBs.
The major parties in the U.K. treat their broadcasts very seriously. PEBs represent the only opportunity to display television messages during the campaign that are unmediated by programme planners, producers, editors or potentially aggressive interviewers. The legal requirement that all five terrestrial channels must broadcast each party's PEB on the same day (although not simultaneously) means that most viewers, from the single-station devotee to the channel surfer, are aware that the PEB is being broadcast--even if a sizeable minority choose not to watch it. Potentially, PEBs can still reach the vast majority of the electorate. Despite the substantial proliferation of broadcasting channels available in Britain, it is estimated that the audience share for the television channels forced to carry PEBs remains at 80 percent, while the equivalent figure for radio stations is about 35 percent (Electoral Commission 2001). The 2001 British Election Study campaign panel survey found that 58 percent of the electorate saw at least one PEB during the campaign, and 37 percent saw7 PEB from all three major parties, reflecting very similar estimates to those produced by commercial polling surveys commissioned by the Electoral Commission (MORI 2001) . At the same time, Independent Television Commission (ITC) survey research found that during the campaign 57 percent of respondents claimed either to switch channels or to turn off when a PEB was broadcast (ITC 2001) . Moreover, even if not viewed directly, secondary commentary on the contents of PEBs is often carried extensively in the daily press-the equivalent of U.S. "ad-watches."
The simple and obvious task of television advertising is to persuade voters to take a more favourable view of the broadcasting party vis-a-vis its opponents. In principle, rational political advertisers seek to reinforce the commitment of their existing supporters, to persuade neutrals to view the party more sympathetically, and to raise doubts in the minds of supporters of opposing parties about the likely performance of their currently preferred party choice. PEBs attempt to achieve these objectives through a mixture of advocacy and attack. Advocacy involves making a positive appeal to voters. The party stresses its own record, in national, local or regional government, in satisfying voters' demands. It emphasises its own vision and policies for the future and indicates how these will contribute to meeting voters' continuing needs and aspirations. Attack implies "going negative." It involves, inter alia, criticising the record of the opposing party or parties; questioning the judgement, experience and probity of opposing leaders; and generating fear about what the future might hold if the opposing party or parties were in power.
Mixed advocacy-attack PEBs in the U.K. are relatively rare. Indeed, in the 2001 election campaign, all of the transmitted broadcasts were based either on advocacy or attack. In order to consider the impact of PEBs on voters, we had originally hoped to compare the effects of exposure to both attack and advocacy ads broadcast by each of Labour, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats. In practice, this proved impossible. Although Labour transmitted both attack and advocacy PEB, the Conservatives broadcast only attack ads while the Liberal Democrats adopted an exclusively advocacy approach. As far as the Liberal Democrats were concerned, therefore, we were able to assess only the effectiveness of their advocacy approach. However, for the Conservatives, we attempted to assess what the effects of an advocacy approach would have been, had they chosen to use one, by exposing a group of our respondents to an advocacy broadcast that been made by the shadow Secretary of State for Education in March 2001. The broadcast, transmitted just before the official campaign began, was the same length as a PEB and was a statement of the Conservative Party's plans for education if they were successful in the next general election.
Before we state our specific hypotheses about the possible impact of exposure to PEBs, we need to introduce the dependent variable measures that we employ in our empirical analysis. Britain has an emerging three-party system in its Westminster parliament. In the 2001 general election, the Liberal-Democrats received almost 18 percent of the popular vote and secured over 50 of the seats in the House of Commons. Analysing the consequences of exposure to PEBs, therefore, does not merely involve assessing voters' views of Labour, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrat parties in isolation from each other. Voters who take a more (less) favourable view of one party as a result of being exposed to PEBs implicitly take a less (more) favourable view of another in terms of electoral choice. In principle, any opinion changes that might result from exposure to PEBs involve three main choice-sets: Labour versus Conservative, Conservative versus Liberal-Democrat, and Labour versus LiberalDemocrat. Although the Labour versus Conservative choiceset is clearly the most important for the majority of U.K. voters, the other choice-sets are of increasing significance in British politics. Accordingly, in our empirical analysis we employ three separate scales as dependent variables. These measures were constructed in two stages.
In the first stage, for each party, we calculated a measure of "party image". We used party image scores because of the need in experimental analysis to use multiple indicators of key concepts. The use of multiple indicators helps to insulate the analysis from random variations in subjects' responses to individual questionnaire items. In conducting our experiments we did not ask respondents' vote preferences in both the pre-test and post-test. This was because we felt that, during the course of an experiment that lasted no more than one hour, it was not feasible to ask respondents on two separate occasions how they intended to vote in the forthcoming general election. However, we were able IN THE 2001 U.K. ELECTION ADVERTISIKG to ask our subjects, both before and after our experimental test exposures, about (I) their feelings towards each party leader, (2) their feelings towards each party, and (3) the likelihood that they would vote for each party All of these items were measured on 0-10 point scales. Reliability tests showed that the three items scaled satisfactorily in both preand post-tests for all three parties, yielding Cronbach's alpha scores greater than 0.8 in every case. Pre-and post-test party image scores for each party were calculated by summing the scores on these three items and dividing by 3.
The second stage of our dependent variable measure construction involved combining each pair of party image scores for both pre-and post-test scales. Thus, for example, the Labour versus Conservative pre-test scale was constructed by subtracting the Conservative party image scores from the Labour party image scores. This produces a 21-point "LabCon"' scale that varies from -10 (very positive image of the Conservatives) to +10 (very positive image of Labour). The post-test scale was produced in the same way. Equivalent pre-and post-test scales were also constructed for "ConLib' (where +10 denotes a very positive Conservative image and -10 denotes a very positive Liberal Democrat image) and for LabLib (where +10 denotes positive Labour and -10 positive Liberal Democrat).
The specific hypotheses that we test, together with their implications for pre-test to post-test changes in our LabCon, ConLib and LabLib scales, are outlined in Table 1 . Our first set of hypotheses reflects the expectations of the rational politicians who produce PEBs. Other things being equal, politicians believe that they can persuade voters to take a more favourable view of their respective parties. They use advocacy PEBs in order to Increase the attractiveness of their own party (H,,) and attack PEBs to reduce the attractiveness of opponents (Hlb). If their efforts at persuasion are successful, these two approaches should have "symmetrical effects" in the sense that they should have the same empirical implications for our choice-set scales. In comparison with our control groups (discussed below), exposure to Labour's advocacy or attack PEBs should lead to post-test increases in LabCon and LabLib scores (implying a more favourable view of Labour relative to each of its main rivals). Similarly, exposure to Conservative PEBs should reduce LabCon and increase ConLib (implying, in both cases, relatively more sympathy for the Conservatives), while exposure to the Liberal Democrat PEBs should reduce both LabLib and ConLib (implying increased relative sympathy for the Liberal Democrats).
Given the frequency with which politicians' aspirations are confounded, it would be surprising if the "simple persuasion" embodied in H, applied universally Indeed, it has long been recognised that the effectiveness of political messages depends both on the political context in which advertising is undertaken and on the characteristics of different subgroups of the target population (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Klapper 1960 ).
H,reflects the simple contextual point that in party-based electoral contests, most voters are very familiar with the advocacy messages produced by the major parties. The long campaign invariably begins well before the dissolution of parliament. Politicians use legislative debates, formal speeches, policy launches, by-elections, local and regional elections, and journalists' briefings throughout the parliamentary cycle to influence press and television reporting. In these circumstances, through constant repetition, the public becomes familiar with the arguments and styles of presentation that the parties espouse (Norris et al. 1999 ). Advocacy advertising is accordingly unlikely to benefit the two parties-Labour and the Conservatives-that receive the lion's share of media coverage throughout the long campaign, precisely because the marginal effect of exposure to one more advocacy message is likely to be negligible. In contrast, the Liberal Democrats-who tend to receive substantially less media coverage prior to the start of the official campaignare likely to benefit from an advocacy approach. This suggests that the consequences of exposure to the Liberal Democrat Advocacy PEB should be non-trivial. Indeed, such exposure should reduce both ConLib and LabLib scores (implymg increased sympathy for the Liberal Democrats).
H, refers to a second possible contextual effect-the potentially counterproductive character of attack broadcasting in party systems where confrontational party politics is endemic. Anyone who has watched a broadcast of the proceedings of the House of Commons will be familiar with what in contemporary British political journalism is often called "yah-boo politics." In Commons debates and question sessions, insults, asides, and interjections are traded freely. MPs frequently jeer at the opposing side3 speakers or talk when they are speaking so that they cannot be heard. Points are typically scored as much by embarrassing opponents as by serious and considered political argument. It would be surprising if this sort of combative party activity, reported on an almost daily basis on radio and television news, had no effect on the way that voters view negative political messages. Indeed, it is entirely possible that, in the context of U.K. party politics, negative attack PEBs could have precisely the opposite effect to that intended by their creators. Voters know that PEBs represent an opportunity for parties to present a positive (advocacy) vision of their plans for government. Against a background of endemic yah-boo politics, many voters may react with irritation to yet another negative onslaught on the opposition that consciously spurns an advocacy opportunity In these circumstances, such voters may even be inclined to take a more critical view of the offending, sponsoring party and to view the target of the attack with a greater degree of sympathy Although this reaction is unlikely among the partisans of the sponsoring party, it seems plausible to us to suppose that both neutral voters and those who are partisans of other parties may well react in such a contrary manner.
H, provides a direct corollary to H,. If, as H, suggests, Party X' s attack PEB fuels a counterproductive response among both neutrals and the partisans of Parties Y and Z, X' s attack may nonetheless serve to stiffen the resolve of X' s partisans. Hq accordingly suggests that Party X identifiers = who are exposed to X' s attack PEB will be reinforced in their Finally, H, concerns the extent to which voters think they dislike of rival parties. It is entirely possible, of course, that can trust the messages conveyed in PEBs in general. Voters U.K. parties' primary aim in producing attack broadcasts who generally trust these messages are clearly more likely to is to strengthen the loyalty and commitment of existing be persuaded to take a more sympathetic view of the adversupporters. However, the potential mobilising benefits among tising party and/or a less sympathetic view of its opponents partisans implied by H, need to be set against the potential than those who display low levels of trust. This again counterproductive reversals among neutrals and others that implies an interaction effect. To the extent that respondents are implied by H,. An assessment of the balance of costs and trust PEBs in general, exposure to Party X' s PEBs should be benefits of attack PEBs clearly requires an empirical evaluation associated with a pre-to post-test increase in Party X' s image of the impact of such broadcasts on voter opinion.
relative to its opponents. contrast, this project used a large cross-section of the public, involving some 919 participants selected by quota sample that was broadly representative of the Greater London electorate (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Table 2 compares the socio-demographic characteristics and key political attitudes of our respondents with those of the respondents to the 2001 British Election Study panel survey. As the table shows, with the exception of ethnicity (which should have been higher in our sample since around 20 percent of Londoners are from ethnic minorities), the profiles of the BES and experimental samples are very similar. This reinforces our confidence that our results have considerable relevance beyond the specific groups of subjects who participated in our experiments. Our experiments involved administering a pre-test questionnaire to each respondent. Respondents were then randomly allocated to one of 14 test or control groups. The experiments, each 30 minutes in duration, involved watching a video compilation, reading compilations from newspaper articles, or exploring party websites. The video compilations, including the PEBs, were configured to represent a typical evening news program during the campaign. We drew on stories recorded from all the main news programs on the terrestrial channels in the three months prior to polling day The videos were edited to follow the same format. This consisted of a "sandwich" with ten minutes of identical, standard footage at the top and bottom of each program and one of the different experimental video stimuli There are clearly many ways of seeking to assess the effects on voters' perceptions of exposure to political advertising. Panel survey designs, where the panel waves straddle an election campaign offer one obvious approach. However, even with a very tightly defined survey-based design, it is extraordinarily difficult to show that any observed changes in preference result from exposure to the particular set of messages being analysed-rather than from exposure to the multiplicity of other campaign messages that are not being analysed (Hovland 1959; Iyengar and Simon 2000) . The huge advantage of an experimental design is that respondents' views can be ascertained immediately prior to exposure to a known message and then re-assessed immediately afterwards. Provided that suitable controls are applied-in particular, that subjects are randomly assigned to test and control groups-any change in perceptions that are observed can be linked more directly to the exposure than is the case with survey designs.
This said, experimental designs carry their own limitations. First, experimental exposures are by definition artificial. We sought to reduce the artificiality of our experimental settings by ensuring that our respondents watched PEBs in a relaxed environment, in small groups of four or five. Second, many experiments are limited because they rely upon small groups of student respondents and it is difficult to generalise from these results to the general population. In = Conservative 'attack' PEB focused on cnme and fuel tax. Labour's 'advocacy' PEB described the Blair government's record on a range of key issues lncludlng the economy and public services. Labour5 'attack' PEB concentrated on the Consen~atives' past economlc record and warned of the risks to prosperity of their re-election The Liberal Democrats' 'advocacy' PEB focused on the party's leader, Charles Kennedy Transcripts of the PEB are available at wwwpippanorris.com.
(news, sport, or a PEB) in the middle core. Respondents were not told which media was being shown to which group, or even that different media were being used by different groups of respondents. Respondents were told that the experiments were concerned with selective perception-how men and women, young and old people differed in their views of the media. After these various exposures, respondents completed a post-test questionnaire. The entire process took about an hour to complete. The full details of the methodology, including the stimuli and questionnaires, are available at www.pippanorris.com. Table 3 summarises the full range of experimental groups that we examined. In the analysis that we report here, we regard our PEB groups (N = 239) as our test groups. As our control group, we combine the "explicit" control group (N = 91), who were shown stories about sport in the middle core of their video, with the campaign learning group (N = 389), who were supplied with factual information about the campaign. These two groups had very similar profiles in terms of pre-and post-test responses to a wide range of attitudinal questions, including those about the political parties. Combining them both as our control group for estimation purposes substantially increases the number of cases that we can analyse and hence strengthens the robustness of our results.'
An important Caveat
Throughout the foregoing discussion, and in the ensuing empirical analysis, we attempt to distinguish between the effects of attack and advocacy PEBs. It should be stressed that in so doing we are not in a position to follow the classic experimental design developed by Iyengar and Ansolabehere (1995) . In that study, both positive and negative ads used the same presenters and focused on the same issues, arguments, and personalities. In these circumstances, it was a relatively straightforward matter to attribute any test differences to the positive or negative character of the ads concerned. In our analysis, as described above, we used the actual PEB that the parties chose to broadcast in the 2001 U.K. general election. We are confident that any neutral observer would agree with us as to which of the PEBs we used represented an advocacy approach and which represented an attack. However, it must be acknowledged that the presenters, the personalities and the issues and arguments covered varied across the PEBs that we employed. (For details, see Table 3 , Note b.) This obviously restricts our ability to determine definitively whether it is specifically the advocacy or attack character of a particular PEB per se that produces any observed effect on partyimage-or whether it is the issue-focus, the presenter, or something else. This does not mean, however, that we cannot draw any inferences about the likely effects of attack as opposed to advocacy PEBs in 2001. In our view, although any apparent observed attack or advocacy effect could derive from personality or issue-coverage differences in the PEBs to which our respondents were exposed, it is equally possible that they could indeed derive from genuine differences in the effects of attack as opposed to advocacy messages. With our limited experimental design, we cannot definitively establish advocacy versus attack causal effects. However, we can to some degree provide preliminary evidence for the idea that, in the U.K. at least, the two varieties of approach may in certain circumstances have different sorts of effect. It is in this
The statistical results that denve from using only the N = 9lexplicit control group are simllar to those reported here. However, with less degrees of freedom involved in the statistical estimation, the results are not as robust as with those with the larger N = 389 control group used here. We exclude the "posltivelnegative tele\r~sion news" group shown in Table  3 from our analysls here, since these respondents were given Information that expllcltly presented the vanous parties m e~ther a favourable or an unfavourable Ilght. To have included these groups In our analysls here would clearly have risked contaminating our control group with preclsely the sort of effects that we were explicitly trying to assess in our PEB test groups. In order to assess whether the messages contained in the PEB had any effect on our respondents' political views, we use a model specification that enables us to make a fair comparison of the pre-test to post-test changes in respondents' attitudes toward the parties across the test and control groups.
The model that we employ has four main components. First, following standard practice in experimental and 2-wave panel survey designs (Iyengar and Simon 2000; Whiteley and Seyd1998), we use a lagged endogenous variable specification in which the post-test party image scores constitute the dependent variable and the pre-test party image scores appear as an independent variable on the right-hand-side of the equation. This specification implicitly models the change in pre-to post-test party image scores without artificially constraining the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to unity. Second, the exposures to the five, test PEBs (Labour advocacy and attack, Conservative advocacy and attack, and Liberal Democrat advocacy) are regarded as independent interventions that allow us directly to test the rival claims of HI and H,. Third, we include a series of interaction terms designed to capture the various claims, embodied in hypotheses H, to H,,that certain groups of respondents will react distinctively to exposure to different sorts of PEB. These include interactions (a) for partisanship and exposure, and (b) for trust in PEBs in general and exposure. Finally, we control for prior partisanship. Simply being involved in an experimental process that asks participants about their political attitudes, that then presents them with media messages that contain some political content, and that then, inter alia, again solicits their political views could in itself trigger a positive reinforcement of existing political preferences. In order to take account of this possible'priming effect, which could in principle have affected all of our respondents-not just those in our test groups, we include appropriate terms for partisanship. Our working assumption is that, other things being equal, Party X' s partisans will be more likely to view Party X favourably and less likely to view its opponents favourably2
The specific expectations that we have for the effects of partisanship are as follows:
Pre-test Labour Partisadnot: Increases LabCon and LabLib scores; Pre-test Consen~ative Partisadnot. Increases ConLlb score: reduces LabCon score; Pre-test Liberal Democrat Partisadnot: Reduces ConLib and Lablib scores.
In order to avoid burdening the reader with an unnecessary number of null hypotheses and null effects we do not report here the effects of controlling for respondents' soclo-demographic characteristics (age, gender, class, ethn~aty, and education), levels of polit~cal interest, and television-watching habits. Adding terms for these variables to the reported equations makes no substantial difference to the results reported here.
Our formal model specification for assessing the effects of exposure to PEBs in the Labour versus Conservative choice set is:
where LabCon is a 21-point Labour versus Conservative party image scale as described above; the subscript t l refers to the pre-test, t2 to the post-test; b, and b, measure the effects of partisanship; b, to b8measure the simple effects of exposure to PEBs as in H,and H,;b, to b,, measure interaction effects between PEB exposure and partisanship as in H,and H,; b,, to b,, measure interactions between exposure and trust in PEB in general, as in H,; and el is a random error term. Table 4 reports the results of estimating [ l ] with our experimental data, together with equivalent models for the Conservative versus Liberal Democrat (ConLib) and Labour versus Liberal Democrat (LabLib) scales. Only those independent variables that are relevant to each choice-set are included in the estimation. (For example, in the LabCon model, only Labour Partisanship and Conservative Partisanship terms are included; Liberal Democrat Partisanship is excluded). Estimation is by OLS. The coefficients reported in the table need to be interpreted carefully since they refer to movement along 21-point choice-set scales. Thus, for example, the b = -. 10 in the LabCon model for exposure the Conservative Advocacy PEB means that exposure was associated with a 0.10 point movement away from Labour to Conservative-though this change was not statistically significant. The b = +.36 for the same exposure variable in the ConLib model means that exposure to the Conservative Advocacy model was also associated with a 0.36 point movement away from the Liberal Democrats to the Conservatives-though again, the change was not statistically significant. The robustness of the estimates reported in Table 4 Age, gender, ethn~city, class, and education have all been assoc~ated, to varying degrees, with patterns of party support in previous studies of U.K.vonng Stokes 1974, Sarlmk and Crewe 1983; Heath et al. 1985 Heath et al. , 1991 Heath et al. , 1994 However, there is no reason to suppose that these variables should be systematically lmked to changes m party Image scores simply as a result of our respondents' partlclpatlon in our experiments. We include them as controls simply to ensure that our results are not biased by their omission. A slightly more consistent pattern of partial support is apparent in the H, block of Table 4 . People who, in the pretest, admitted to being more trusting of PEBs in general were likely to respond to the Labour and Conservative attack PEBs in more or less the way that party managers had presumably hoped they would. The interaction between Conservative attack exposure and trust in PEB produced both a significant reduction in Labour support vis-a-vis the Conservatives (b = -.48) and a significant increase in Conservative support vis-a-vis the Liberal Democrats (b = .27). Similarly, trust/Labour attack exposure interaction term produced a significant increase in Labour support relative to the Liberal Democrats (b = .29). Yet again, however, the results in the H, block indicate that these effects were not universal. No such effects were observed in relation to any of the advocacy PEB/trust interactions.
Finally, the partisanship control variables in the equations behave more or less as anticipated. Labour and Conservative partisanship dispose those parties' respective adherents to take a more favourable of their party's imagethough this pattern does not extend to the Liberal Democrats, who have fewer partisans (only 9 percent of our sample) in any case.
All of this suggests that, in general, party election broadcastsfailed to exert vety much effect on voters' party images in the 2001 U.K. general election. There were certainly no simple, universal PEB exposure effects that applied to all groups of voters. Given the widespread belief, embodied in Hla and Hlb, that political communications can exert quite powerful effects on voters' perceptions and political preferences, this absence of a generalised experimental effect clearly requires some explanation. Although we are able only to speculate in this regard, we consider it likely that five main factors contributed to this lack of an overall effect. First, the experimental stimuli that we provided, although they replicated the PEB exactly as they were shown on television, were of a relatively limited duration. It is entirely possible that PEB messages in general require several repetitions before they can significantly affect the perceptions of all groups of voters. Second, as anticipated in H,, the PEB messages to which we subjected our respondents were delivered after a long campaign stretching back to the 1997 general election in which similar messages had already been repeatedly presented. H, suggested that the familiarity thus engendered was likely to render advocacy PEBs ineffective for the two major parties but not for the Liberal Democrats. Our results suggest that even the Liberal Democrats failed to generate a more favourable party image in response to their advocacy broadcast. Perhaps they, too, suffered from being too familiar with voters-with the attendant indifference to their messages thus implied.
A third possible reason for the overall lack of general PEB exposure effects relates to partisanship. Partisanship is well known to act as an affective filter, which strongly colours the way in which new information is interpreted (Clarke et al. 2004) . In these circumstances, it seems likely that our participants' prior partisan orientations affected the way in which they responded to our experimental stimuli. Indeed, the terms for Conservative and Labour partisanship are hlghly significant, and in the expected directions, in all three of the equations reported in Table 4 . In short, when prior partisanship is controlled for, the party-images of voters in general are unlikely to be affected by exposure to PEB. A fourth reason for the lack of general PEB exposure effects concerns the relatively low levels of trust in the reliability of PEBs as sources of political information. We asked our respondents to rate the trustworthiness of several information sources on a 0-10 scale. Unsurprisingly, our respondents rated PEB (mean score = 3.4) as being the least trustworthy source after television news (mean = 6.81, newspapers (4.81, and the internet (3.8). In these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that respondents typically appeared to discount the information that they received in our PEB exposures. When considered in conjunction with the filtering effects of partisanship, it is easy to appreciate how mistrust of PEBs could reduce PEB's effectiveness as tools of general persuasion. Finally, it is possible that the PEBs the parties chose to broadcast in 2001 were themselves simply ineffective vehicles for getting the respective parties positions across.
Any or all of these reasons could help to explain why the models reported in Table 4 produced such a dearth of generalised exposure effects in 2001. Collectively, they seem to us to provide a plausible account of the overall absence of systematic, 'simple' exposure effects. Nonetheless, the results shown in Table 4 also indicate that there were two partial effects that merit emphasis. First, the Conservative attack PEB significantly damaged the Conservatives in their race against Labour. Similarly, the Labour attack PEB damaged Labour in its race against the Conservatives-though the effect was at the margins (p = ,061 of statistical significance. These two effects are clearly consistent with H,, which suggests that attack PEBs can have counterproductive consequences for the attacking party There is no evidence that these effects extended to the Conservative-Liberal Democrat or Labour-Liberal Democrat races. However, given that Labour and the Conservatives were attacking each other in their respective PEBs, there is no obvious reason why the Liberal Democrats should have been affected by the attacks one way or the other. Indeed, the empirical results reported in Table 4 (see the null effects for all the H,., terms in the both the ConLib and the LabLib columns of the table) indicate that they were not thus affected.
The second partial effect that bears emphasis concerns partisans' reactions to exposure to their own party's PEBs. H, anticipated that such exposures are likely to reinforce partisans' relative dislike of the opposing party. The Conservatives' attack PEB certainly seems to have had a less damaging effect among its own partisans than it had among nonidentifiers and other partisans. However, exposure to the Conservatives' advocacy PEB also lead to its partisans downgrading their image of the Conservatives vis-a-vis the Liberal Democrats. This important ambiguity in the pattern of results reported here suggests that both attack and advocacy advertising in the 2001 U.K. general election, in certain restricted contexts, had the opposite effects to those that were intended.
Experimental evidence in the U.S., where political advertising on television is ubiquitous, suggests that T. V ads can have quite profound effects on voters' orientations towards politics and political parties. The Iyengar and Ansolabehere studies in the U.S., and the subsequent analyses that their seminal work has stimulated, are based on identical formats in which, for example, only the tone of the ad (positive or negative) is varied as the experimental stimulus. This enables the researchers to specify very precisely what produces any difference in response that might be observed across test/control groups. The research design that we have employed to study the effect of PEBs in the U.K. is much more restricted than that employed in the most well known U.S. studies. In the analysis reported here, our critical experimental stimuli were the actual broadcasts produced by the parties themselves, in a situation-the 2001 U.K. general election-where political advertising on television is severely restricted. This enables us to draw fairly strong inferences about the effects that the various PEB had, on various subgroups of the population, in the U.K. in 2001. However, it also means that we can be less clear as to precisely what it was about the parties' various broadcasts that lead them to have the distinctive set of effects that we have described. In this sense, our analysis is important only to the extent that it shows how different sorts of PEB are capable of producing different sorts of exposure effects in a specific context. We cannot be certain that it was precisely the attack or advocacy character of a given PEB that produced this or that effect. However, we can legitimately claim to have provided preliminary evidence for the idea that advocacy and attack advertising may have had differential effects on U.K. voters' political perceptions in 2001.
Our overall findings can be summarised very simply. First, the PEBs shown on British television in 2001 had very little direct effect on voters' images of the three main political parties. The likely reasons for this derive, inter alia, from the filtering effects of partisanship and from the low levels of trust that most U.K. voters place in the information provided by PEBs. Second, attack PEB in the U.K. can have the counterproductive of increasing relative support for the target of the attack. Our speculation is that this reflects widespread public disillusion in the U.K. with the sort of confrontational politics that characterises much of the broadcast proceedings of the House of Commons. This mechanism did not operate uniformly in 2001 but it clearly applied to the Conservatives' attack PEB and, rather less decisively, to Labour's attack PEB. Third, even advocacy PEBs can have damaging results for a party's support among sub-groups of the population-witness the downgrading of the Consen~atives' image vis-a-vis the Liberal Democrats among Conservative partisans who were exposed to the Tories' advocacy PEB. Given the general failure of any of the parties' 2001 PEBs to produce the imageenhancing results that the parties themselves undoubtedly hoped for, party mangers in the future might consider foregoing the dubious benefits that appear to be associated with the right to broadcast PEBs. Further research, probably along the lines adopted by Iyengar and his colleagues in the U.S., is clearly necessary in order to determine the precise extent to which negative versus positive messages, as opposed to differential personality and issue-emphases, really affect voters' political perceptions in future U. Note: Informat~on about the Greater London population is denved from the 1991 Census. This I~mits strict comparability, for example with the growth of council house sales during the last decade. The 1997 vote for the three major parties is based on analysis of Bntish Parliamentary Constituencies compared with recalled vote m the previous election, excludmg non-voters and others. Quotas were employed by the fieldwork company in the initial selection of participants to match their background against the characteristics of Greater London population.
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